It has been argued that support for the First World War by the important French syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) has tended to obscure the fact that other national syndicalist organisations remained faithful to their professed workers' internationalism: on this basis syndicalists beyond France, more than any other ideological persuasion within the organised trade union movement in immediate pre-war and wartime Europe, can be seen to have constituted an authentic movement of opposition to the war in their refusal to subordinate class interests to those of the state, to endorse policies of 'defencism' and to abandon the rhetoric of class conflict. This article, which attempts to contribute to a much neglected comparative historiography of the international syndicalist movement, re-evaluates the syndicalist response across a broad geographical field of canvas (embracing France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Britain and America) to reveal a rather more nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture. While it highlights the distinctive nature of the syndicalist response compared with other labour movement trends, it also explores the important strategic and tactical limitations involved, including the dilemma of attempting to translate formal syndicalist ideological commitments against the war into practical measures of intervention, and the consequences of the syndicalists' subordination of the political question of the war to the industrial struggle.
Introduction
In an important recent contribution to our understanding of the organised trade union movement's response to the First World War, Wayne Thorpe has argued that European revolutionary syndicalist organisations (to use the very broad term for a number of different but related revolutionary union movements that were also known variously as 'industrial unionist' and 'anarcho-syndicalist'), viewed internationally, were unique in not supporting the imperialist ventures of their respective governments. Evidence is provided to suggest that support for the war by the important French syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), has obscured the fact that five other national syndicalist organisations -in belligerent Germany and Italy, and in neutral Spain, Sweden and the Netherlandsremained faithful to their professed workers' internationalism. On this basis, it is argued, syndicalists beyond France, more than any other ideological persuasion within the organised trade union movement in immediate pre-war and wartime Europe, can be seen to have constituted an authentic movement of opposition to the war, refusing to subordinate class interests to those of the state, to endorse policies of 'defencism', or to abandon the rhetoric of class conflict. subordination of political issues to the industrial struggle. 4 In an attempt to build on and extend Thorpe's pioneering contribution, so as to explore both the strengths as well as the limitations of the syndicalist stance towards the First World War, this article presents a much more disaggregated picture with a different and broader geographical field of canvas for study. Thus, as well as re-evaluating (and providing new evidence on) the syndicalist response in countries such as France, Italy and Spain that Thorpe's work comments on, there is also consideration of other syndicalist or syndicalist-inclined movements in Ireland, Britain and America that he omitted. 5 In the process, the study reveals a rather more nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture of the syndicalist movement to the one presented by Thorpe.
The research, which attempts to contribute to a much neglected comparative historiography of the international syndicalist movement, draws primarily on two 7 The Socialist Party gradually abandoned the pacifist internationalism that had previously led them to condemn Spain's colonial adventure in Morocco, and moved towards an overtly pro-Allied interventionist position. By contrast, the CNT professed to see only an equality of war guilt among the aggressor ruling classes, insisting it was of no concern to Spanish workers which side won, and demanding Spain's absolute neutrality in the war. Jóse Negre, the first secretary of the CNT, even went so far as to declare: 'Let Germany win, let France win, it is all the same to the workers, who will continue to be exploited and tyrannised just as before the war, and probably more than before'. What is so regrettable is that, deceived by the tendentious campaign of the belligerent press, a host of sincere militants, instead of preparing for the revolutionary general strike, put their packsacks on their backs, thinking that they really were going to the trenches to defend Liberty and Justice.
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Despite the fact the CNT (who had only just emerged from a period of illegality) were in disarray at the beginning of the war with barely 15,000 members, they were able to expand to 30,000 by the early part of 1915, and in March 1916
Solidaridad Obrera appeared as a daily. 12 Their internationalism, albeit essentially propagandist in nature, undoubtedly proved attractive to a layer of the most militant workers, but the fact that Spain was not itself plunged into participation in the war also meant the hostile pressures on the CNT were much less severe than in belligerent countries. Moreover, a crucial contributory factor to the organisation's expanding membership (and of that of the socialist-led union confederation the Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) was mounting working class opposition to food shortages and speculation arising from the war, which fused into underlying discontent with the political regime. The CNT's syndicalist commitment to destroying capitalism through direct action and revolutionary industrial struggle meant they were well placed to intervene to take advantage of the situation. In response, Connolly sought another route to initiate a revolution, becoming one of the main instigators and leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916, an insurrection that he believed would link the cause of Irish freedom to the wider international battle against imperialism. 21 Even though Ireland was a tiny country, Connolly -11 -thought it could play a particularly crucial role by striking a blow against the greatest empire of the day based in Britain, and in the process set off a chain reaction:
'Starting thus, Ireland may yet set the torch to a European conflagration that will not burn out until the last throne and last capitalist bond and debenture will be shrivelled on the funeral pyre of the last war lord'. growth in numbers and influence occurred primarily because they were able to be both beneficiaries of, and contributors to, the wartime industrial struggles and broader political issues (beyond the question of the war) that arose. By contrast, in
France and Italy the situation was much more problematic.
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France and Italy: internal schisms, patriotism versus internationalism
In France, in the face of the immediate threat of military defeat by Germany, the syndicalist movement's professed internationalism spectacularly collapsed. In fact, the CGT can only plausibly be seen as a revolutionary syndicalist body from its inception in 1902 until the outbreak of the war. There had always been other important forces inside the organisation apart from the anti-war revolutionary tendency, notably the pro-war reformists. With the outbreak of war the latter gained the ascendancy and effectively became recruiting agents for the imperialist conflict.
As a result of their early elaboration of syndicalist philosophy, their national prominence and their broader influence on the European syndicalist movement generally, the collapse of the French CGT was of major significance.
Even though the internationalist principles of the CGT were swept away overnight in August 1914 they had made important prior efforts to avert the coming war despite growing government repression. Thus, true to syndicalist doctrine the CGT had campaigned vigorously against patriotism. The bourgeoisie was viewed as relying upon the patriotic sentiments of the workers to distract them from their fundamental economic conflict with capital and to bind them more fully to the defence of bourgeois interests; the real division was not between nations but between the exploited and exploiters. The CGT's 1908 Marseille Congress had recalled the formula of the First International: 'The workers have no fatherland!'. 26 In place of national patriotism, they advocated international working class solidarity.
Such a viewpoint naturally led to a campaign of opposition to the threat of war. In 1908 the CGT had openly threatened that any declaration of war should be -14 -met with a revolutionary general strike, although significantly this resolution was careful to commit the confederation to no more than propaganda and to specify that the strike should be international. Nonetheless, in 1910, when the delegates of the Second International had agreed to turn over the responsibility of deciding anti-war tactics to a specially created bureau, 20,000 CGT supporters turned out at the congress of Toulouse to protest against war. 27 In November 1912 a peace demonstration was staged in Paris, attracting some 60,000; and the unions called for a show of force in December, with a 24-hour general strike, which repeated the call for the international working class movement to meet the outbreak of war with a revolutionary general strike. Although government repression deflected some of the strike's impact, about 80,000 French workers were involved in these demonstrations. 28 Despite such revolutionary internationalist sentiments and activities important counter-forces were also apparent. The reformists inside the CGT (organised in some of the larger unions and federations) were led by a powerful leadership, who represented a sizeable, albeit initially minority, body of opinion within the confederation. While they were committed to practical activism and strikes to win material improvements in workers' conditions, they rejected what they considered to be the more violent forms of direct action, such as sabotage and the general strike, particularly against the backcloth of the hostility of employers (who financed 'yellow' unions, imported 'blacklegs' and hired gunmen to intimidate strikers and pickets) and was a 200,000-strong metalworkers' strike, in which CDS militants played a key role channelling beyond bread-and-butter issues into an anti-war protest, although their influence was defused by the arrest of strike leaders and transfer of a few hundred mobilisés to the trenches. 36 The immediate post-war years led to an increasing polarisation within the CGT between a reformist majority and a revolutionary minority, with the latter receiving a marked accession of strength from the Russian Revolution and the dangerously high social tensions that the war had generated. The internationalists split away to form the Confédération générale du travail (CGTU), a body which eventually became allied to communism.
In Italy, the outbreak of war also created turmoil (albeit on a much less significant scale than in France) within the 100,000-strong Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI), the largest syndicalist organisation outside of France. The Italian government, which had been in alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, had initially declared its neutrality. But after ten months Italy finally entered the war in May 1915, joining the Anglo-French-Russian alliance. It was a deeply unpopular decision that was opposed by parliament, the Catholic Church, the Socialist Party and its trade union confederation. The Socialists became the largest political movement in a belligerent state to refuse to endorse the national war effort. As part of this process, the USI also immediately avowed opposition to war with its central committee urging on 8
August 1914 that if the government abandoned its neutrality all workers should respond with an insurrectionary general strike. we do when western civilisation is threatened by the suffocating imperialism of Germany and only our intervention can save it? I leave the answer to you'. 40 He said the greatest menace to the revolutionary cause was not a war but rather the threat of a German victory. Such a victory, he felt, would destroy the proletarian movement and leave the workers in the clutches of German exploiters. 41 Thus, the pro-war 'interventionists' asserted that while the syndicalists were anti-militarist they were not pacifist and that the war would provide the opportunity for a revolution that would destroy the liberal political system and the monarchy. movement, into a pro-interventionist organ. 43 Overall, they succeeded in taking almost one-third of the USI's membership, some 30,000 out of 100,000. Whilst the group was too small to be effective on a national scale, it was large enough to greatly limit the effectiveness of the USI, even though the bulk of Italian syndicalists confirmed their anti-militarism and internationalism.
In response to the interventionists, the USI executive selected Bologna as the said, 'and it is not for me, a man who could not be drafted for war, to tell others that they should go to war, or tell them they should not go to war'. 56 In the event,
roughly 95 per cent of eligible Wobblies registered with their draft boards and most of those served when called. At the same time, as in America, the shop stewards' leaders refused to agitate politically against the war (albeit from a minority position). Instead they insisted the issue was beyond the bounds of the Workers' Committees' and that they should limit themselves to immediate shopfloor concerns related to wages and conditions. They adopted such a stance in the syndicalist belief that maximum unity to win militant action on such industrial issues was more important than the broader, more hotly disputed, political questions, including the war, which threatened to puncture such unity. 62 It was an approach highlighted in sharp relief by the publication of J.T. Murphy's pamphlet The Workers' Committee, the chief theoretical statement to emerge from the National Administrative Council of the shop stewards' movement. 150,000 copies of the document were sold, an indication of its widespread influence.
Significantly, despite being written in 1917 the pamphlet made absolutely no mention of the war and the political issues it raised. Instead, it reduced the immense economic and political problems that lay behind the growth of the Workers'
Committees to the level of industrial organisation. 63 Ironically, even those shop stewards' leaders who were members of revolutionary socialist parties, such as the British Socialist Party and the Socialist Labour Party, acted no differently. No doubt Murphy, Gallacher and others denounced the war at BSP and SLP meetings, but they made no attempt to propagate their views publicly amongst the rank-and-file in the factories for fear of losing support, remaining content to merely defend workers against the threats to their organisation brought about by the war. In effect, they -30 -wore two hats, one reserved for their party activities, the other, a shop steward's hat, to be worn as a representative of the rank-and-file, many of whom were, initially at least, pro-war. 64 Ironically, in many respects every issue workers faced and every industrial dispute over wages and conditions of work was inherently profoundly political, since they all arose directly as a result of the government's determination to win outright victory in the war. As a consequence, the extreme political circumstances of the war, and the perceived failure of the labour leaders to defend workers in the face of an all-out attack by employers and the state, opened up possibilities for a class-wide agitation for militant trade unionism that fused immediate economic issues with a political challenge to the employers and the state over the war. In the event, as
Murphy and others later acknowledged, relying simply on the industrial struggle had the effect of handing the political initiative to the 'patriotic' reformist labour leadership, isolating the movement to the engineering industry and limiting its overall potential. 65 Although the end of the war initially saw widespread industrial militancy, with the rundown of the munitions industry and subsequent heavy unemployment, it also brought a rapid demise of the shop stewards' movement.
So to recap, although they gained significant influence and were able to lead important workplace struggles, the syndicalists' tradition of treating politics as something external to the workplace and shopfloor unrest as simply an economic issue in both America and Britain effectively undermined the impact of their internationalist opposition to the war.
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Assessment
In conclusion, Wayne Thorpe 
